Human behavior can change the spread of infectious disease. There is limited understanding of 1 how the time in the future over which individuals make a behavioral decision, their planning 2 horizon, affects epidemic dynamics. We developed an agent-based model (along with an ODE 3 analog) to explore the decision-making of self-interested individuals on adopting prophylactic 4 behavior. The decision-making process incorporates prophylaxis efficacy and disease prevalence 5 with individuals' payoffs and planning horizon. Our results show that for short and long 6 planning horizons individuals do not consider engaging in prophylactic behavior. In contrast, 7 individuals adopt prophylactic behavior when considering intermediate planning horizons. Such 8 adoption, however, is not always monotonically associated with the prevalence of the disease, 9 depending on the perceived protection efficacy and the disease parameters. Adoption of 10 prophylactic behavior reduces the peak size while prolonging the epidemic and potentially 11 generates secondary waves of infection. These effects can be made stronger by increasing the 12 behavioral decision frequency or distorting an individual's perceived risk of infection.
Introduction
Proportion of prophylactic agents in the population. i
Proportion of infectious agents in the population. r
Proportion of recovered agents in the population. b S Probability that an agent in the susceptible state becomes infected upon interacting with an infectious agent. b P Probability that an agent in the prophylactic state becomes infected upon interacting with an infectious agent. ρ
Reduction in the transmission probability or rate when adopting prophylactic behavior: b P = ρb S (0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1). Note that we refer to 1 − ρ as the protection. g
Probability an infectious agent recovers. d
Probability an agent in the susceptible or prophylactic state decides which behavior to engage in. κ
Distortion of the perceived proportion of infectious agents in the population (i.e. distortion factor). an agent-based version of the disease dynamics model using the Gillespie algorithm [12] (see 95 Supplemental Information). 96 If we assume that the population is well-mixed, the dynamics can be generated using a 97 5/23 system of ODEs: 98 ds dt = − βsi − δsW(i) + δp (1 − W(i)) (1a) dp dt = − ρβpi + δsW(i) − δp (1 − W(i)) (1b)
where s, p, i, and r are the proportion of susceptible, prophylactic, infectious, and recovered 99 agents in the population. The parameters β, γ, and δ are transmission, recovery, and decision 100 rates, whose equivalent probabilities are, respectively, transmission (b S ), recovery (g), and 101 decision (d) ( Table 2 ). The parameter ρ refers to the reduction in transmission rate when 102 adopting prophylactic behavior. We convert between rates and probabilities using equations 103 x = − ln (1 − y) and y = 1 − e −x , where x and y are rate and probability values 104 respectively [8] . One unit of continuous time in ODE corresponds to N time steps in ABM.
105 Table 2 . Disease parameters in rates and probabilities.
Rate
Probability Description Probability to parameter parameter rate conversion on behavior X (denoted T X|DX ),
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Pr
(2)
7/23
The expected time spent in state X can be expressed as
which simplifies to the desired expectation,
Notice that 1 fX − 1 is the expected value of an uncensored geometric with minimum value of 142 zero and that the second parenthetical term rescales the expectation to the interval [1, H] . 143 Next, we derive the expected time spent in I by conditioning on T X|DX .
After considerable algebra, we get the expectation,
Again, the expectation of the uncensored geometric is 1 g − 1 . The the second parenthetical Eq. (6) is defined only so long as f X = g. When f X = g, we instead have
Finally, the agent calculates the expected time in state R by subtracting the expectations for 149 X and I from H,
Notice that for each of the expected waiting times calculated in Eqs. (4), (6) and (7) , as H goes 151 to infinity, the rescaling terms go to one so that the equations yield the familiar expected values 152
for the uncensored geometrics.
153
Having calculated these expected waiting times, the agent then calculates the utility for the 154 8/23 two possible behaviors using,
and 156
Note that when agents calculate expected times for states S and P, they need not consider the 157 possibility of alternating to the other state in the future. This is because they assume a constant i 158 which implies the best strategy now will remain the best strategy at all times during H. 
Distorting knowledge of i. Recall that assumption (iii) that underlies the behavioral decision 165 model is that agents know the prevalence of the disease accurately. We relax this assumption to 166 investigate how distorting this information effects the SPIR model. To achieve this, we replace i 167 with i 1 /κ in the calculation of utilities where κ serves as a distortion factor. When κ = 1, i is not 168 distorted; when κ > 1, the agent perceives i to be above its real value and when κ < 1 the 169 opposite is true. To implement this distortion, we simply redefine f X in the expected waiting 170 time equations (i.e. Eqs. (3)- (7)) with f X = i 1 /κ b S when X = S and f X = i 1 /κ ρb S when X = P. 171
Results and Analysis 172
The SPIR model is suitable for helping understand the influence of human behavior for diverse 173 infectious disease epidemics. To illustrate specific characteristics of the model, however, we 174 focus here on two contrasting diseases characterized by their severity, recovery time, and harm: 175
Disease 1 is acute, has a long recovery time, and may cause chronic harm, and Disease 2 is mild, 176 9/23 has a short recovery time, and cause no lasting harm. Table 3 shows the biological and 177 behavioral parameter values used to generate the results discussed next, unless stated otherwise. 178 Table 3 . Input parameters for two hypothetical contrasting diseases.
Behavioral
Behavioral Decision Analysis
179
Here we analyze the behavioral decision model used by the agents to decide whether or not to 180 engage in prophylactic behavior. In particular, we are interested in identifying the level of Region A corresponds to the situation in which agents never engage in prophylactic behavior 189 because the utility of being in the susceptible state is never less than the prophylactic state 190 regardless of disease prevalence ( Fig. 2A ). This situation occurs for low protection efficacy or 191 short planning horizons. In the case of low protection efficacy, agents do not have an incentive 192 to adopt prophylactic behavior because they expect to get infected regardless of their behavior. 193
Thus, their best strategy is to become infected and then recover in order to collect the recovered 194 payoff as quickly as possible (i.e. "get it over with" susceptible behavior and for the prophylactic behavior otherwise.
207
Region C corresponds to the situation in which two switch points exist instead of a single one 208 (Fig. 2C) . When the proportion of infectious agents is between these switch points, agents adopt 209 prophylactic behavior, while values outside this range drives agents to adopt non-prophylactic 210 behavior. This situation is of particular interest because it shows that the adoption of 211 prophylactic behavior is not always monotonically associated with the prevalence of the disease. 212
The utility calculations that agents use to decide whether to adopt a behavior are complex 213 (see Eqs. (9) and (10)); an exhaustive exploration of the parameter space is not undertaken here. 214 We instead investigate several paradigm cases related to the payoff ordering. We assume that the 215 payoff for the infectious state (u I ) relies upon biological parameters of the disease and always 216 corresponds to the lowest payoff, thus we need only consider the relationship between the other 217 three payoffs. In particular, we are interested in looking at situations where the recovery payoff 218 ranges from complete recovery (case 1) to less than the prophylactic state (case 4). In (A) and (E) the payoff of being susceptible and recovered are equal, which means that agents recover completely from the disease after infection. In (B) and (F), the recovered payoff is lower than the susceptible payoff, but still greater than the prophylactic payoff meaning that it is more advantageous being recovered than in the prophylactic state. In (C) and (G), any advantage comparison between being in the prophylactic or recovered state is eliminated. In (D) and (G), the disease debilitates the agent meaning that they would be better off engaging in prophylactic behavior rather be in the prophylactic state than the recovered state. 
234
The effects of progressively reducing the recovered payoff are more evident for Disease 2.
235
Reducing the recovered payoff means that lower levels of prevalence will be sufficient for agents 236 to change their behavior. In the case of equal value for recovered and susceptible payoffs, agents 237 consider changing behavior only in narrow parameter range of protection efficacy and planning 238 horizon values (Fig. 4E) . Progressively reducing the recovered payoff, i.e. moving from case 1 239 (Fig. 4E ) to case 4 (Fig. 4H ), the range of parameter values that would make agents change their 240 behavior expands (i.e. there are large areas of the parameter space in which the agents would 241 13/23 consider changing behavior) and the disease prevalence necessary for such change to occur 242 decreases (i.e. gradual change of the color towards blue).
243
In addition to this numerical analysis, we have also obtained analytical results for case 2
244
(payoff ordering u S > u R > u P > u I ) to identify the general conditions necessary for the 245 existence of one or more switch points. Mathematically, switch points occur where the utility 246 functions for S and P are equal (Eqs. (9) and (10)). Replacing the expected time notation 
Given that
Let K 1 = uS−uR uI−uR , which weights the benefits of S and I, and K 2 = uP−uR uS−uR , which weights the 251 benefit of S and P. Then,
Because the payoff ordering u S > u R > u P > u I and noting that T I|S ≥ T I|P and K −1 1 = uI−uR uS−uR , 253 we have that K −1 1 T I|S − T I|P ≤ 0 and 0 < K 2 < 1. From these we analyze some general 254 cases.
255
First, we analyze the case in which K 2 T P|P − T S|S ≥ 0, then K 2 T P|P ≥ T S|S . Because T I|S − T I|P ≤ 0, there never is a switch point and agents will strictly opt for the 257 prophylaxis (i.e. state P).
258
A more interesting case is when the planning horizon H is long enough to produce the
This case always produces a switch point and occurs when 
Epidemic Dynamics

273
We turn now to understand how the above conditions for behavioral change may influence Fig. 5 ).
288
In the cases of H = 45 and 90 for Disease 1 and H = 30 for Disease 2, however, agents 289 change behavior, affects the epidemic dynamics. For Disease 1, the effect is characterized by the 290 decrease on the peak size and a prolonged duration of the epidemic. Although the dynamics of 291 Disease 2 are also affected, the effect is small because a lower portion of the population crosses 292 the switch point.
293
In other cases, increasing the planning horizon further may cause agents to never 294 contemplate a change in their behavior, for example H = 90 for Disease 2. This means that 295 agents willingly assume the risk of getting infected and then recover, which seems intuitive 296 given the short recovery time and severity of the disease.
297
To assess the effect of the frequency that agents make behavioral decisions on the epidemic 298 dynamics, we fix the value of the planning horizon for Disease 1 (H = 90) and Disease 2
299
(H = 30), and vary the decision rate. Figure 6 shows the effects of different decision frequencies 300 16/23 on the epidemic dynamics. This figure illustrates how increasing the decision frequency reduces 301 the peak size while prolonging the epidemic, and additionally may generate multiple waves of 302 infection for Disease 1. These multiple waves are generated because increasing the decision 303 frequency means individuals react faster to an increase in prevalence and adopt the prophylactic 304
behavior. This bends the trajectory of disease incidence downward, but the reduction in China (approximately 5,327 cases), people in the city of Guangzhou avoided going outside or 313 wore masks when outside [21, 20] . Combined with the severity of the disease, other factors like 314 misinformation or excess media coverage may distort the real perception of disease prevalence 315 (i.e. risk perception), making individuals respond unexpectedly to an epidemic.
316
Several models incorporate specific mechanisms regulating the diffusion of information 317 about the disease to understand the above factors and how they contribute to the distortion of 318 risk perception [5, 10, 18] . Here our focus is slightly different. We are interested in 319 understanding the effects that such perception distortion has on the epidemic dynamics. Thus in 320 our model, we have incorporated a distortion factor κ that alters the agents' perception about 321 disease prevalence used in calculating their utilities. For κ = 1, agents have the true perception 322 17/23 of the disease prevalence; for κ > 1, the perceived disease prevalence is inflated and κ reflects 323 an increase in the risk perception of being infected; for κ < 1, the perceived disease prevalence 324 is reduced below its true value.
325
Distorting the perception of a disease prevalence can lead to changes in the decision making 326 process, and consequently on epidemic dynamics, as illustrated in Fig. 7 (see Fig. S2 for Disease 327
2). Figure 7A shows the proportion of infectious agents above which the prophylactic behavior 328 is more advantageous than non-prophylactic behavior assuming agents know the real disease 329 prevalence (κ = 1). By distorting the perceived disease prevalence to increase the risk 330 perception of being infected (κ = 1.5), the real proportion of infectious agents necessary for 331 agents to engage in prophylactic behavior is reduced as shown in Fig. 7B . Hence, the distortion 332 on disease prevalence makes agents engage in prophylactic behavior even when the chance of 333 being infected is low. This affects the epidemic dynamics by reducing the peak size but Figure 7 . Heat maps of switch points and epidemic dynamics for Disease 1. Proportion of infectious agents above which the prophylactic behavior is more advantageous than the non-prophylactic behavior considering the percentage of protection obtained for adopting the prophylactic behavior (1 − ρ) × 100 and the planning horizon H. (A) No perception distortion, thus κ = 1; while (B) Distortion factor κ of 1.5, which reduces the proportion of infectious agents above which the prophylactic behavior is more advantageous. (C) Epidemic dynamics for different distortion factors that shows how increasing κ reduces the peak size and prolongs the epidemic.
Individuals acting in their own self-interest make behavioral decisions to reduce their likelihood 337 of getting infected in response to an epidemic. We explore a decision making process that 338 integrates the prophylaxis efficacy and the current disease prevalence with individuals' payoffs 339 and planning horizon to understand the conditions in which individuals adopt prophylactic 340 behavior.
341
Our results show that the adoption of prophylactic behavior is sensitive to a planning horizon. 342
Individuals with a short planning horizon (i.e. "live for the moment") do not engage in 343 prophylactic behavior because of its adoption costs. Individuals with a long planning horizon 344 also fail to adopt prophylactic behavior, but for different reasons. They prefer to "get it over Moreover, the agents take into consideration only the payoffs of being susceptible and recovered 356 when optimizing the contact rates. In the SPIR model, however, agents maintain a constant 357 contact rate, yet adopt prophylactic behavior that reduces the chance of getting infected. When 358 agents are deciding to engage in prophylactic behavior, they take into account the payoff of all 359 possible epidemiological states. The fact that we reach the same conclusion using different 360 models further supports the claim that the planning horizon is a relevant decision making factor 361 in understanding epidemic dynamics.
362
Although associated with the prevalence of disease, the adoption of prophylactic behavior is 363 not always monotonically associated with it. Its adoption depends on the behavioral decision 364 parameters. For severe diseases with long recovery time, e.g. Disease 1, the option of 365 prophylactic behavior is less sensitive to changes in the payoffs (Fig. 4A-D) compared to less 366 19/23 severe diseases with shorter recovery time, e.g. Disease 2 (Fig. 4E-H) . Therefore, understanding 367 the payoffs related to each disease is critical to proposing effective public policies, especially 368 because there is not a "one-size-fits-all" solution.
369
Another aspect to highlight is that the beneficial adoption of prophylactic behavior can be 370 achieved through two different public policies: change the risk perception or introduce 371 incentives that reduce the difference between the susceptible and prophylactic payoffs. The 372 problem with increasing the risk perception is that if it is overdone, it leads to the opposite result 373 to the one that is desired. Because individuals perceive their risk of getting the disease as highly 374 probable, they prefer to "get it over with" and enjoy the benefits of being recovered. In contrast, 375 the more the prophylaxis is incentivized the better the results, e.g. reduction of epidemic peak 376 size.
377
Similar to our SPIR model, Perra et al. [15] and Del Valle et al. [4] also proposed an 378 extension to the SIR model and included a new compartment that reduces the transmission rate 379 between the susceptible and infectious states. A clear distinction between these models and the 380 SPIR model is that their agents do not take into account the costs associated with moving 381 between the susceptible compartment and this new compartment. While in Perra et al. [15] 382 agents make the decision to move between compartments based on the disease prevalence, in 383 Del Valle et al. [4] new constant transfer rates are defined to handle the transition.
384
In addition to these differences, an advantage of the SPIR model with respect to all other 385 models that implement some behavioral change is the distinction between the disease dynamics 386 and behavioral models. This distinction renders the model flexible by making it easier to, e.g. 
